Greg Detre
Tuesday, 02 April, 2002
(see http://barney.gonzaga.edu/~mquieto/ethics/sympathy.html)
there are various problems
with sympathy for Hume
different people
feel different levels of sympathy
certain
groups/individuals attract more sympathy than others
we may be ignorant
of others� suffering
�if sympathy is the
foundation of morality, then we are free to behave according to our prejudices
in dispensing benevolence� (article)
he�s too optimistic about human nature, and how sympathetic we are (i.e. how unsympathetic people can often be)
if sympathy is like aesthetics:
then �a false relish may be corrected by argument and reflection� (Enquiry, 178)
i.e. �some education by way of instruction and/or experience must occur in order to develop the natural sympathies� (article)
but then there is the possibility of maladjustment
he�s reducing human nature by stating that sympathy is its fundamental element
at best, a definition of human nature describes what human nature is � it cannot reform that which is defined
it is a process of the thing defined making the definition
definitions
are linguistic, and so culturally defined (hmm???)
they do probably reflect one�s own social values, biases etc.
definitions
of human nature are essentialist � the �logical fallacy of begging the
question. The argument is inherently circular in nature: �Humans are X because
X is part of human nature; X is part of human nature because humans are X.��
(???)
�He purports to explain the how's, what's and why's of human behavior and moral decision-making. He does not, however, seek to discuss the "oughts" of human behaviour� (article)
falls victim to his own fact-value distinction
�If sympathy causes moral action, And sympathy is common to all humans, Then all humans will engage in moral actions�
the
ordering and terminology are the main changes when he re-wrote the Treatise
into �Of Passions� in his Four Dissertations
higher animals:
share:
our basic passion repertoire (love, hate, feel pride and shame, desire, enjoy, suffer, hope, and fear), including our ability to learn from experience
lack:
our moral, aesthetic, religious, and philosophical �sentiments�
passions = �impressions of reflection�, reactions of pleasure/displeasure to some perception of our situation
(excluding a few instinctive appetites)
all passions have objects (i.e. aboutness, or �intentional directedness� (Brentano)
direct passions = caused by their objects
e.g. desire, joy, sorrow, hope and fear
indirect passions = more complicated, e.g. pride, involves both the thought of something that pleases and also the recognition of that good thing as belonging to a particular person (and bringing them pleasure)
if the person is you, the pleasure is pride
if it�s someone else, you feel affection/esteem
the basic �causes� of all passions are �agreeable� pleasure and �uneasy� pain/distress, and thoughts about their causes/occasions
traces �the double relations of impressions + ideas� (???)
association by resemblance explains the transitions in our emotional life from one pleasure to another (e.g. from being pleased by a witticism to the speaker)
love + hate = not indirect, but simply �passions of a more complicated nature�, ones which �imply more than one view or consideration�
violent (vs calm) passions = when it produces �sensible emotion� or �sensible agitation�
when one passion swallows up another, getting �new force and violence�
when a passion encounters opposition/delay in gratification, or where the object is temporarily absent/concealed
uncertainty
violence is not the same as strength, but the �force� that violent passions involve strengthens a passion
custom, by giving us �facility�, can strengthen a passion despite the fact that it removes some causes of violence, e.g. agitating novelty, challenge, and uncertainty
the production + ocnduct of the passions has a �certain regular mechanism�, susceptible to laws
wants to explain the errors of rationalists partly as confusing calm passions with reason
sympathy = sharing the feelings of others perceived to be like ourselves, or related to us
passions can be communicated through bodily response and our response
enlivens a mere idea of another�s passion into an impression
we spontaneously imitate the expressed state of mind of those around us
extended by our ability to imagine what others would feel in various circumstances
bolstered by any sort of similarity (in manners, character, country etc.)
essential for the possibility of the �moral sentiment�
this corrects for natural partialities in our sympathy
comparison = interfers with the workings of sympathy, which leads us to ask whether we are doing better/worse than others
we can welcome another�s misfortune, rather than feel compassion, if that misfortune improves our own fortune
explains malice + envy
remorse = malice against oneself
envy = typically felt for close close in position to ourselves, and even when we�re superior, if our inferiors seem to be advancing
passions are impressions, i.e. active psychological causes, sufficient to cause action
because they�re impressions of reflection, they incorporate information from memory, beliefs, reason + reflection
will = the transition from thought + passion to action
the �mechanical� nature of human passions is found to be corroborated by the �uniformity and regularity� (i.e. predictability) of human conduct
we have at best the �liberty of spontaneity�, when the determining causes of our behaviour are internal rather than �violent� external causes (overriding our conscious wishes???)
liberty = �the power of acting/not acting according to the determinations of the will�
the will�s determinations = have their own psychological determining causes
therefore liberty a property, not of the will, but of the agent (agrees with Hobbes)
account of motivation:
the complicated mechanism of our passions
(closely affected by memories, beliefs + imaginings)
leads to our intentions (the determinations of our will)
get realised in our actions
(as long as we�re at liberty and do not forget/change our minds)
because our passions determine our actions, their evaluation is very important (see �Of Tragedy� and �Of the Standard of Taste�)
moral evaluation = always the evaluation of �character�, of �principles in the mind + temper�
different sorts of sensitivity, or �delicacy� (see �Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion�)
Hume�s �moral psychology� bears a striking similarity to Spinoza�s
e.g. his deterministic version of our psychology, and in various details (e.g. the effects of vacillation), his account of the effect of opposition on the violence of a passion (desiring what is forbidden) and his negative treatment of remorse
moral judgement is primarily about human character traits (recognition of virtues and vices)
controversial views about:
what enlightened moral judges will/won't include in their lists of virtues
how they do their judging
in his �catalogue of virtues�:
artificial (convention-dependent) virtues = conformity to some beneficial social scheme of cooperation
will take different forms in different societies/times
(see �justice� below)
natural virtues = fairly invariant across cultures
e.g.:
compassion
generosity
gratitude
friendship
fidelity
charity
beneficence
clemency
equity
prudence
temperance
frugality
industry
courage
ambition
due pride (duly concealed to avoid offending others)
due modesty (awareness of one�s weaknesses)
due self-assertiveness
good sense
wit and humour
perseverance
patience
courage
parental devotion
good nature
cleanliness
articulateness
responsiveness to poetry
decorum
�a certain je-ne-sais-quoi of agreeable and handsome� which �render a person lovely or valuable�
controversially:
substituted pride for humility
inclusion of qualities not dependent on the possessor�s will
particular glosses, e.g.
courage = �to be exercised, if possible, in non-military contexts, so that it need not involve killing or �the sack of cities�
charity = �Giving alms to common beggars is naturally praised; because it seems to carry relief to the distressed and indigent: but when we observe the encouragement thence arising to idleness and debauchery, we regard that species of charity rather as a weakness than a virtue�
self-conscious rejection of a puritan (and Christian) morality
he finds some of the virtues in The whole duty of man (Protestant religious tract, the �delusive glosses of superstition and false religion�) to be vices
hedonist
all virtues are qualities that please from a moral point of view either:
because they prove �agreeable� (tend to bring pleasure) to their possessors or others
seen to have utility for their possessors or others
he rejects:
�celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude and the whole train of monkish virtues�
as neither agreeable nor useful
they �stupify the understanding and harden the heart, obscure the fancy and sour the temper�
but he does borrow from many of the duties listed in The whole duty of man and from Cicero�s Offices (he told Hutcheson this was his preferred source book on morals)
agreed with some of the vices in The whole duty of man:
e.g. �Not loving peace�, and� �going to law on slight occasion�, as well as theft, ingratitude, lying, malice, and oppression
he doesn't say enough about what�s wrong with murder (as distinct from cruelty)
though he discusses parricide and tyrannicide � which forms of killing are vicious, and why?
doesn't properly discuss either artifice-grounded right to life or a natural virteu of respect for human life
defends suicide, and discusses varying tolerance of it
it is not merely a verbal matter that he chooses not to categorise the involuntary virtues as �talents�
he thinks a sharp distinction between them is only needed by those handing out rewards/punishments, and so hoping to regulate voluntary actions
moral approbation/disapprobation need not be preludes to reward/punishment � they are the more or less spontaneous expression of moral sentiments, themselves no more voluntary than their objects
�Philosophers, or rather divines under that
disguise, treating all morals on a like footing with civil laws, were
necessarily led to render this circumstance, voluntary or involuntary, the
foundation of their whole theory� (Enquiries: 322). Hume does not treat morals
this way, and so he is just as �necessarily led� to resist the restriction of
moral judgment to the voluntary. (???)
on a like footing with civil laws, and so sanction-backed
artificial virtues = consist in conformity to some generally beneficial convention, where the benefit accrues not by act, but from the �whole scheme of actions�
general conformity is needed for the benefit to be obtained, so pressure is deliberately brought to bear
justice = rendering each their due
primarily respect for property rights
depends upon a �general sense of common interest�, on the perception that although any single property-respecting act may not bring advantages, indeed may involve loss, still� �the whole system of actions, concurr�d in by the whole society, is infinitely advantageous to the whole and to every part�
briefly discusses �retributive justice� under liberty of the will
�equity� is included as a natural virtue
requires institutions/conventions (e.g. government, social institution of promise, government) to be in place
e.g.:
promise-keeping (or contract, taken as mutual promise)
allegiance = to magistrates
female modesty + chastity = preparation for/conformity to women�s role in marriage)
the duties of sovereign states (to keep treaties, respect borders, protect ambassadors and conform to the �law of nations�)
similar analysis to property rights: until a convention fixes which assurances are binding assurances, there will be no promises or contracts. The fixing, as in the case of property, will contain some elements of arbitrariness
�We are not surely bound to keep our word because we have given our word to keep it�
The only way men can have any confidence that the children born to their wives are �really their own� (Treatise: 571) is by taking as wives only those women trained from
childhood to an unnatural �modesty�, �some preceding backwardness or dread� of sexual activity, and then by imposing the �punishment of bad fame or reputation� on any wives suspected of infidelity
we have a self-interested motive to adopt the conventions of artificial virtue, since they�re so designed that general conformity to their rules does bring advantages to �the whole and every part� of society
but it�s easy to lose sight over time of the �remote� and long-term interest one has in respect for established property rights
we usually see what�s wrong with disrespect for property rights when we�re on the wrong end of it, seeing it as �vice� and feeling disapprobation
this leads us to feel sympathy with other victims, and our �sympathy with public interest� leads us to condemn all breaches of property rights
Hume grants there may be no convincing answer to the �sensible knave� who successfully conceals his dishonesty and believes he does better than a scrupulously honest person
if he hasn�t been given �an antipathy to treachery and roguery� through education, then the moralist probably won't be able to change his mind
although the moralist may believe that the knaves are �the greatest dupes�, since they �have sacrificed the invaluable enjoyment of a character, with themselves at least, for the acquisition of worthless toys and geegaws�
virtues are recognised as such by the moral sentiment = a special pleasure taken in agreeable and useful character traits, when surveyed from a �general and steady� point of view
moral distinctions are not made by �reason alone�, but by the special sort of pleasure/displeasure we taken in character traits and in the �manners� (ways of behaving) that express them
it is our approbation/disapprobation that makes traits virtues or vices
take a special point of view in order to �converse together on any reasonable terms� about human merits � it�s a �steady and general� points of view which we have reason to expect others to be able to take, and from which agreement is in theory possible
we have to be capable of sympathising with other people�s viewpoints and correcting of rnatural bias in our sympathy in order to �overlook our own interest� and get a general view
discusses apparent moral disagreement in �A Dialogue�, and �Of the standard of taste� discusses the analogous apparent disagreement about literary merit
due to: confusion, lack of proper preparation/competence
we are all capable of becoming competent moral judges (if we are able and willing to rid our minds and hearts of �the illusions of religious superstition and philosophical enthusiasm�)
but literary criticism requires both �delicacy of taste� and extensive reading
tries to refute the rationalists (e.g. Samuel Clarke) who thinks that moral distinctions can be discerned by pure reason
two parts to the argument:
1. the conclusions of reason are ideas, but only impressions can motivate (as moral distinctions should)
suggests that the rationalist is confusing calm passions (which don't agitate us) for passionless reason
rests on his various distinctions drawn earlier
2. there just do not seem to be any rationally discernible facts/relations to establish the sort of conclusion which the rationalist moralist expects to be able to draw
argued earlier that only four of the (�philosophical�/cognitively discernible) relations of ideas can be traced by �demonstration�: resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality and proportion in quantity/number
challenges rationalists to point out the extra morally relevant relation
it must relate inner actions/states of mind to mind-external objects, and be obligatory for all rational beings
further observation:
to move from a factual claim to a conclusion about how we ought to behave, you need to explain how to derive the �ought� of the conclusion from the �is� of the premise (the fact/value distinction)
this is a similar challenge as before, i.e. how to found obligations on rationally discernible relations, i.e. to show why that relation/fact should show fix for them what to do
vulgar systems may be subverted by this, but he does not claim to have shown that there is no adequate answer from more refined systems
main argument:
�Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be deriv'd from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already prov'd, can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.� (Treatise III i 1, para 6.)
the famous postscript presents the 'is'-'ought' distinction (Treatise III i 1, last para)
Hume takes this to reinforce his main point in this section, but it needn't be taken so
presumably, the main argument is more about reason + motivation???
�To have the sense of virtue is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character.� (Treatise III i 2, para 3)
i.e. If 'reason' is not the basis of the distinction
between virtue and vice, we seem to have to appeal to sentiment or feeling
�The hypothesis we embrace ... defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary.� (Enquiry, Appendix I)
Hume's task is then to explain how it comes about that the conventional virtues and vices excite the appropriate feelings in us
Roughly, some qualities are intrinsically agreeable to ourselves, and others useful to ourselves; other qualities are agreeable or useful to others. Other qualities again, if generally possessed, lead to general advantage. The crucial thing is that Hume does not think that we are only interested in our own benefit: we are also moved by a natural tendency to feel sympathy for other human beings, and Hume takes this to be the origin of our approval of altruistic virtues, such as benevolence.
Hume's conception of reason belongs with a certain view of the world and our relation to it: he thinks that only a dispassionate and disengaged faculty could discover truth and falsehood, or reveal the world as it really is
a modern version of Hume's main argument is:
1. Nothing which influences action [in the way desires do] can be true or false
2. Moral judgements influence action [in the way desires do]
(a version of ethical internalism)
3. \ Moral judgements cannot be true or false.
the is-ought distinction:
a) It is not simply the claim that an evaluative conclusion cannot be derived from wholly non-evaluative premises; it seems to rule out the possibility of any substantial moral principles
b) It should not be described as a 'fact'-'value' distinction, since Hume's point could be accepted by someone who thought there were moral facts, as long as they thought that moral facts were of a quite different kind from other facts
1. Hume cannot allow that someone who was cold or unfeeling could make moral judgements (see Enquiry, V, ii).
2. Is there in fact a distinctive kind of feeling which goes with the observation of virtue, or of vice?
3. Although Hume's account seems in some ways like an attempt to provide a justification of morality in answer to the question, 'Why should I be moral?', it seems in fact to be nothing other than a social-psychological conjecture. To put it crudely, it's about causes, not justifications.
4. It is unclear that sympathy is more natural or more fundamental than delight in another's misfortune, or jealousy of another's good fortune: is it then just a fact about human psychology that we approve of the one and not the other?
5. Hume seems to have no satisfactory answer to the problem he raises himself (Treatise III 3 1, para 14; Enquiry V, ii): our sympathy varies with distance, but our moral evaluation does not.
Moral internalism derives its significance from its role in the main Humean argument for the claim that there cannot be moral truths (see above)
the step (�moral judgements influence action in the way that passions do�) is an expression of a form of internalism
Roughly speaking, internalism is the view that there is a conceptual or internal connection between moral considerations and motives or reasons for action. Externalism is just the denial of internalism (???)
(A) It is conceptually impossible to judge that one (morally) ought to A and not embark on A-ing;
(would make weakness of will untenable)
(B) It is conceptually impossible to judge that one (morally) ought to A and to have no motivation at all to A (to remain unconcerned about A-ing);
(C) It is impossible rationally to judge that one (morally) ought to A and to take oneself to have no reason to A (i.e., no justification for A-ing).
�
�
Two psychologically plausible cases are supposed to show that internalism-(B) is false
1. The amoralist, who knows quite well what morality demands, but simply doesn�t care about morality
2. The person suffering from accidie, who (in a state of depression, perhaps) has lost the will to do anything
we should note that all that internalism ever requires is that moral judgements should be as motivating as (e.g.) desires are; but a person suffering from accidie might well want to get up and do something, and still do nothing about it
One thought behind the denial of internalism might be this. Someone only counts as being motivated if the likelihood of her acting is higher with the supposed motivation than without it.
then it might seem that one could judge that one ought to A without the probability of one�s A-ing being raised at all
Two difficulties with this:
1. It is not a simple, and perhaps not an empirical matter to determine whether someone has really judged that she ought to A;
2. It is not obvious that the probabilistic account of motivation is right; this seems to depend upon a causal view of reasons in general.
Can we understand the point of classifying value judgements together unless we count them as those which engage our feelings? (???)
is Hume�s account of the artificial virtues + justice pure contractualism???
�Recent contractarians have claimed Hume as one of them, despite his explicitly dismissing as absurd the suggestion that the agreement on which the obligations of justice rest could possibly itself be a mutual promise, and his rejection, both in the Treatise and in his essay �Of the Original Contract�, of the view that the authority of magistrates must rest on some promise or contract tying governor to governed. He agrees with the contractarians that the origins of justice lay in some sort of agreement that it was in everyone�s interest to make with everyone else, but he would probably reject the label �contractarian�, and he certainly would not agree with those who try to make all of morality, not only justice, rest on a hypothetical self-interested agreement� (Routledge)
why does Hume need to define human nature???
what is sympathy??? relation to passions???
Hume as virtue ethicist???